Monday, October 25, 2010
Thursday, September 23, 2010
KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF OCHA KENYA HUMANITARIAN UPDATE VOL. 63
• Implementation of new Law takes precedent after August 2010 referendum
• The 2009 census results suggest 33 per cent urbanisation growth since 1999
• Torrential rains in western Kenya cause flooding and displace 700 families
• La Nina conditions expected to enhance food security in western Kenya, but undermine recovery in northern pastoralist regions
• KHPT endorses transition from annual to multi-annual appeal for emergency and recovery responses
• Food beneficiary populations expected to reduce from 1.6 million?
To access the full report on OCHA Kenya online; follow the link below:
http://tinyurl.com/humanitarian-updates
Please share with your friends.
Regards,
• The 2009 census results suggest 33 per cent urbanisation growth since 1999
• Torrential rains in western Kenya cause flooding and displace 700 families
• La Nina conditions expected to enhance food security in western Kenya, but undermine recovery in northern pastoralist regions
• KHPT endorses transition from annual to multi-annual appeal for emergency and recovery responses
• Food beneficiary populations expected to reduce from 1.6 million?
To access the full report on OCHA Kenya online; follow the link below:
http://tinyurl.com/humanitarian-updates
Please share with your friends.
Regards,
Friday, September 3, 2010
Monday, August 23, 2010
Thursday, August 19, 2010
Monday, August 16, 2010
What we're up to with our YouTube Channel
In this post I would like to tell you how OCHA Kenya’s YouTube channel acts as a distribution platform for building awareness on burning humanitarian issues in Kenya.
We always believed that video messages will have a greater impact on our audience in advocating for humanitarian issues in Kenya. Budget, to buy equipment & professional software to edit, was a big constraint in producing videos. However, that did not hold us back from producing videos. In last few months we produced several short videos ranging from office retreat to Aflatoxin awareness. Although, the quality of these videos were not anywhere near to commercial videos what we managed with our limited resources (microphone and windows movie maker) helped us communicate our messages to our humanitarian partners more effectively and at no cost.
Initially, we used OCHA Kenya website to broadcast our videos to our audience. They were well received by our partners. However, we quickly realized that OCHA Kenya website was limiting in the sense that it did not gave us necessary tools to market our videos and thus not reaching wider audience. Therefore we decided to host our videos on our own You Tube channel.
www.youtube.com/user/UNOCHAKenya
The advantages of having our videos on YouTube channel are many.
First, our viewer could choose to be notified of new videos uploaded to channel simply by subscribing to your channel. Our subscribers are informed of new video published instantly on our Channel.
Second, our channel subscribers influence our videos by commenting, rating and viewing our videos.
And finally, our subscribers can find all our videos on one page.
Posted by:
Sanjay Rane,
IMO OCHA Kenya
We always believed that video messages will have a greater impact on our audience in advocating for humanitarian issues in Kenya. Budget, to buy equipment & professional software to edit, was a big constraint in producing videos. However, that did not hold us back from producing videos. In last few months we produced several short videos ranging from office retreat to Aflatoxin awareness. Although, the quality of these videos were not anywhere near to commercial videos what we managed with our limited resources (microphone and windows movie maker) helped us communicate our messages to our humanitarian partners more effectively and at no cost.
Initially, we used OCHA Kenya website to broadcast our videos to our audience. They were well received by our partners. However, we quickly realized that OCHA Kenya website was limiting in the sense that it did not gave us necessary tools to market our videos and thus not reaching wider audience. Therefore we decided to host our videos on our own You Tube channel.
www.youtube.com/user/UNOCHAKenya
The advantages of having our videos on YouTube channel are many.
First, our viewer could choose to be notified of new videos uploaded to channel simply by subscribing to your channel. Our subscribers are informed of new video published instantly on our Channel.
Second, our channel subscribers influence our videos by commenting, rating and viewing our videos.
And finally, our subscribers can find all our videos on one page.
Posted by:
Sanjay Rane,
IMO OCHA Kenya
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Wednesday, August 11, 2010
The power of Humanity
The power of Humanity lies in addressing HUMANITARIANissues....the desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the affected people following disaster or calamity......it endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace and tranquility amongst all peoples.
Post by: Thomas Nyambane
Post by: Thomas Nyambane
Monday, August 2, 2010
Seven humanitarian lessons for the referendum in Kenya
The constitutional referendum in Kenya is just two days away. Many consider the voting process and any possible consequences in the aftermath, a litmus test for the 2012 national elections. Many, perhaps more, fear a repeat of the 2007-2008 Post-Elections Crisis. There is only a cautious hope in the aid community: back then we got it wrong, especially in the beginning, but then we adapted and eventually got it right. We’ve learned lessons, about the strengths and weaknesses of our humanitarian systems, mechanisms and tools, about the importance of preparedness, about working with national capacities, about responding as one community. For us too, the referendum is a litmus test; of our performance, of our delivery, of our support and of our leadership. But there nare six key lessons we can draw on.
Lesson #1: Be Prepared.
In 2007, the elections were all about non-humanitarian issues and there was no perceived need for humanitarian contingency planning or preparedness. Or so we thought. All efforts from the UN and civil society were targeted a peaceful voting process. Even the fledgling humanitarian community (the OCHA registry carried 24 NGOs, the Kenya red Cross, UNICEF, WFP and OCHA) focused only on violence before or during the elections. Boy, were we wrong! And as the violence and displacement erupted and spread, all of the classic consequences of coordination failure became evident. The number of humanitarian actors grew overnight and commensurate with the growth of displaced camps. Within two weeks, Rift Valley Province was crawling with aid agencies and workers; the Government of Kenya was paralysed by a political stalemate and donors were disbursing large amounts of money wherever someone thought they could do something. Everybody had to be seen and a different kind of conflict erupted – between the aid agencies. Eventually, rational behavior set in and humanitarian reform processes began to show an impact even as the government put in place some institutions and mechanisms to bring the crisis under control.
This time, the aid community and the government have worked together in advance to conscientiously prepare to respond to a possible humanitarian situation. Standard operating procedures have been developed and roles assigned; pre-positioning is being done and everyone is on alert especially in and around identified “hotspots”. Communications platforms have been established and peace actors are using these to prepare the population for peaceful acceptance of results. The peace actors, human rights activists, humanitarian aid workers, security actors, government and civil society are all liaising openly with each other. Which brings up the next lesson….
Lesson #2: You can’t do it alone.
No one agency, actor, government entity can do it alone. The humanitarian response in 2008 certainly had its heroes and there were numerous claims of “We are the best…the only…the main ones who…” In many cases, pride in accomplishment was well-deserved and truly there are few things more gratifying to the human spirit than being charitable and assisting those in need. But with the proliferation of actors, of points of engagement and with the vast sums pouring into Kenya, no one could possibly claim that they did it all by themselves. The Kenya Red Cross for example managed a camp with tents donated by UNHCR, the Rotarians, IOM, and water reservoirs from UNICEF, nutritional programmes by ACF, sanitation facilities by OXFAM, on land made available by a government parastatal and with funds from a plethora of donors. This obviously was a whole community effort and brings up the third lesson.
Lesson #3: Trust and acceptance make for better collaboration.
Whether UN, INGO, Red Cross, civil society, government department, donor, we have to trust each other to be able to carry out our roles responsibly and in a principled manner. With all the actors out there in 2008, competition as I mentioned earlier was fierce; fierce and sometimes ugly. Very few actors acknowledged their own limitations and finger-pointing was common; criticism of humanitarian action was often scathing. But eventually, there was some degree of recognition of each other’s capacities and contribution, of each other’s worth and that for such a collaboration, the sum could be greater than the parts of the whole. This recognition was made easier by the systems, tools and mechanisms that were put in place.
Lesson #4: Systems are important.
We need agreed rules of engagement for humanitarian action. In 2008, the humanitarian reform mechanisms proved a tremendous asset in organizing the humanitarian response. It also proved to be a liability in its vagueness on working with national structures, organized as it is around the international community’s actions. And humanitarian reform has not yet refined its own disengagement. It is clear though that a critical part of preparedness and response is to have well thought out SOPs for the response, with clearly conveyed roles and responsibilities for all actors including when and how to engage and disengage. We’ve also learned the importance of technology when CONCERN made cash transfers to remote communities instead of mounting costly missions to disburse funds and goods; when Ushahidi used its crowdsourcing platform to get information on violence in the slums. And when information can be conveyed using more than just web-based technologies that reach only a few.
Lesson #5: Humanitarian response is possible in the slums.
In 2008, humanitarian actors watched the ebb and flow of populations in the IDP camps and noted the steady movement towards the slums of Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru. Yes, the question was asked repeatedly…”what are doing for IDPs who are not in camps”. The answer was always the same even when couched in hemming and hawing: we did very little, if anything at all. Aid agencies noted the gaps and continued with their admittedly immense task of response to 350,000 people in some 300+ camps. That needy people and IDPs in the slums were given little assistance does not negate their existence, just highlights our inadequacies. But we’ve learned that we can do it. Through an inter-agency collaboration spearheaded by UN-HABITAT and OCHA, civil society, INGOs, UN agencies and government entities working in the slums have come together and set up coordination platforms and mechanisms. These same mechanisms were used to work out how to respond to emergencies in the slums. We now know who is credibly doing what where in the slums as well as their capacities for delivery. The DCs and local authorities have been engaged and communications systems and platforms have been set up in readiness.
Lesson #6: The importance of all-way communications.
We’ve learned that limiting our information sources to just a few officials or agency heads is…well, limiting. Getting information on what is happening from the wananchi who are experiencing it, passing it to the various authorities who can respond, well that is at the core of coordination. Now, there are crowdsourcing platforms for monitoring the voting process, human rights abuses, hate speech, violence and displacement. A system of SMS and web-based alerts and updates will reduce the need and frequency of meetings while allowing for effective and swift response.
Lesson #7: Support national capacities.
In 2008, for the four months until the coalition cabinet was named, government humanitarian action relied heavily on the Kenya Red Cross and the international humanitarian community. Certainly, the KRCS proved itself over and over again and unarguably established its leadership and capacity to deliver in a crisis. In 2010, the GoK has established a coordination platform in the Crisis Response Centre which has proved its mettle in the 2009 drought and the 2010 floods. GoK has developed contingency plans and preparedness strategies; the international community too has elaborated contingency plans and preparedness strategies but importantly, these have been harmonized…within the aid community and with the GoK. The GoK has also elaborated a code of operations for this crisis which recognizes government leadership at national, provincial and district level; KRCS coordinates the operational response and the international humanitarian community will support these efforts in a synchronized way coordinated by the Humanitarian Coordinator.
This support role is less familiar to action-oriented humanitarian aid workers but this may prove to be our humanitarian litmus test. If we pass the test, even in a worst case scenario, we could all transform the humanitarian landscape in Kenya and shape humanitarian interventions in chronic situations.
-Post by
Jeanine Cooper
Head of Office
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs -KENYA
Lesson #1: Be Prepared.
In 2007, the elections were all about non-humanitarian issues and there was no perceived need for humanitarian contingency planning or preparedness. Or so we thought. All efforts from the UN and civil society were targeted a peaceful voting process. Even the fledgling humanitarian community (the OCHA registry carried 24 NGOs, the Kenya red Cross, UNICEF, WFP and OCHA) focused only on violence before or during the elections. Boy, were we wrong! And as the violence and displacement erupted and spread, all of the classic consequences of coordination failure became evident. The number of humanitarian actors grew overnight and commensurate with the growth of displaced camps. Within two weeks, Rift Valley Province was crawling with aid agencies and workers; the Government of Kenya was paralysed by a political stalemate and donors were disbursing large amounts of money wherever someone thought they could do something. Everybody had to be seen and a different kind of conflict erupted – between the aid agencies. Eventually, rational behavior set in and humanitarian reform processes began to show an impact even as the government put in place some institutions and mechanisms to bring the crisis under control.
This time, the aid community and the government have worked together in advance to conscientiously prepare to respond to a possible humanitarian situation. Standard operating procedures have been developed and roles assigned; pre-positioning is being done and everyone is on alert especially in and around identified “hotspots”. Communications platforms have been established and peace actors are using these to prepare the population for peaceful acceptance of results. The peace actors, human rights activists, humanitarian aid workers, security actors, government and civil society are all liaising openly with each other. Which brings up the next lesson….
Lesson #2: You can’t do it alone.
No one agency, actor, government entity can do it alone. The humanitarian response in 2008 certainly had its heroes and there were numerous claims of “We are the best…the only…the main ones who…” In many cases, pride in accomplishment was well-deserved and truly there are few things more gratifying to the human spirit than being charitable and assisting those in need. But with the proliferation of actors, of points of engagement and with the vast sums pouring into Kenya, no one could possibly claim that they did it all by themselves. The Kenya Red Cross for example managed a camp with tents donated by UNHCR, the Rotarians, IOM, and water reservoirs from UNICEF, nutritional programmes by ACF, sanitation facilities by OXFAM, on land made available by a government parastatal and with funds from a plethora of donors. This obviously was a whole community effort and brings up the third lesson.
Lesson #3: Trust and acceptance make for better collaboration.
Whether UN, INGO, Red Cross, civil society, government department, donor, we have to trust each other to be able to carry out our roles responsibly and in a principled manner. With all the actors out there in 2008, competition as I mentioned earlier was fierce; fierce and sometimes ugly. Very few actors acknowledged their own limitations and finger-pointing was common; criticism of humanitarian action was often scathing. But eventually, there was some degree of recognition of each other’s capacities and contribution, of each other’s worth and that for such a collaboration, the sum could be greater than the parts of the whole. This recognition was made easier by the systems, tools and mechanisms that were put in place.
Lesson #4: Systems are important.
We need agreed rules of engagement for humanitarian action. In 2008, the humanitarian reform mechanisms proved a tremendous asset in organizing the humanitarian response. It also proved to be a liability in its vagueness on working with national structures, organized as it is around the international community’s actions. And humanitarian reform has not yet refined its own disengagement. It is clear though that a critical part of preparedness and response is to have well thought out SOPs for the response, with clearly conveyed roles and responsibilities for all actors including when and how to engage and disengage. We’ve also learned the importance of technology when CONCERN made cash transfers to remote communities instead of mounting costly missions to disburse funds and goods; when Ushahidi used its crowdsourcing platform to get information on violence in the slums. And when information can be conveyed using more than just web-based technologies that reach only a few.
Lesson #5: Humanitarian response is possible in the slums.
In 2008, humanitarian actors watched the ebb and flow of populations in the IDP camps and noted the steady movement towards the slums of Nairobi, Kisumu, Nakuru. Yes, the question was asked repeatedly…”what are doing for IDPs who are not in camps”. The answer was always the same even when couched in hemming and hawing: we did very little, if anything at all. Aid agencies noted the gaps and continued with their admittedly immense task of response to 350,000 people in some 300+ camps. That needy people and IDPs in the slums were given little assistance does not negate their existence, just highlights our inadequacies. But we’ve learned that we can do it. Through an inter-agency collaboration spearheaded by UN-HABITAT and OCHA, civil society, INGOs, UN agencies and government entities working in the slums have come together and set up coordination platforms and mechanisms. These same mechanisms were used to work out how to respond to emergencies in the slums. We now know who is credibly doing what where in the slums as well as their capacities for delivery. The DCs and local authorities have been engaged and communications systems and platforms have been set up in readiness.
Lesson #6: The importance of all-way communications.
We’ve learned that limiting our information sources to just a few officials or agency heads is…well, limiting. Getting information on what is happening from the wananchi who are experiencing it, passing it to the various authorities who can respond, well that is at the core of coordination. Now, there are crowdsourcing platforms for monitoring the voting process, human rights abuses, hate speech, violence and displacement. A system of SMS and web-based alerts and updates will reduce the need and frequency of meetings while allowing for effective and swift response.
Lesson #7: Support national capacities.
In 2008, for the four months until the coalition cabinet was named, government humanitarian action relied heavily on the Kenya Red Cross and the international humanitarian community. Certainly, the KRCS proved itself over and over again and unarguably established its leadership and capacity to deliver in a crisis. In 2010, the GoK has established a coordination platform in the Crisis Response Centre which has proved its mettle in the 2009 drought and the 2010 floods. GoK has developed contingency plans and preparedness strategies; the international community too has elaborated contingency plans and preparedness strategies but importantly, these have been harmonized…within the aid community and with the GoK. The GoK has also elaborated a code of operations for this crisis which recognizes government leadership at national, provincial and district level; KRCS coordinates the operational response and the international humanitarian community will support these efforts in a synchronized way coordinated by the Humanitarian Coordinator.
This support role is less familiar to action-oriented humanitarian aid workers but this may prove to be our humanitarian litmus test. If we pass the test, even in a worst case scenario, we could all transform the humanitarian landscape in Kenya and shape humanitarian interventions in chronic situations.
-Post by
Jeanine Cooper
Head of Office
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs -KENYA
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